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Abstract  
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determinants, in urban China since the economic reforms that began in 1978. The intention is to
identify new characteristics of economic inequality. It first shows that income differentials across
and in provinces widened and that their economic rankings were becoming fixed during the
period from 1988 to 1995. Second, age was the major factor in inequality in 1988, while
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Abstract 
This paper reports the results of an analysis of changes in income inequality, and in its 
determinants, in urban China since the economic reforms that began in 1978. The intention is to 
identify new characteristics of economic inequality. It first shows that income differentials 
across and in provinces widened and that their economic rankings were becoming fixed during 
the period from 1988 to 1995. Second, age was the major factor in inequality in 1988, while 
education became the important factor in 1995. Third, education significantly contributed to 
increasing inequality during the period. Fourth, the higher education-level groups had less 
within-group inequality. These changes reflect the penetration of the market mechanism into 
China after the reforms. However, this will be problematic without equality of opportunity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The recent rapid economic growth of the Chinese economy has attracted world attention. 
It achieved average annual growth of 9% in the 1990s. Its gross domestic product (GDP) in 
2002 was more than 10,000 billion RMB (more than US$1,200bn), which is over eight times (in 
real terms) its value in 1978. With the significant improvement of its production capacity, this 
very large market of 1.3 billion people is of great interest to economists, politicians, and 
entrepreneurs in developed countries. 
 Coinciding with this rapid growth rate is a marked increase in income inequality. This is 
an issue of current importance in China. Income inequality in China, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, reached 0.4031 in 1998 and has continued to increase. Inequality in China is greater 
than in Indonesia (0.365 in 1996), in India (0.378 in 1997), in Japan (0.249 in 1993), and in 
South Korea (0.316 in 1993). The increase in income inequality is nettling the Chinese people 
and is regarded by the Chinese authorities as an important matter2. 
 The rapid expansions of the economy and of inequality in China are considered to be 
among the effects of the economic reforms that began in 1978. These reforms, which were the 
stimulus for economic development in China, concentrated first on rural areas. Since 1984, their 
focus has shifted to urban areas. The reforms were introduced gradually. The economic system 
was shifted cautiously toward market-oriented and the opening of the economy was limited to 
specific areas, such as special economic zones in coastal regions. The introduction of foreign 
capital and technology concentrated on such limited regions, and brought rapid economic 
growth to them. Meanwhile, the other regions, not having such opportunities, faced relative 
stagnation. After the Southern Tour Lectures by Deng Xiaoping in 1992, the reforms were 
accelerated to increase the role of the market mechanism. This gave a strong impetus to the 
transition from redistributive, egalitarian allocation to market-based, meritocratic allocation. 
This caused a substantial change in the income inequality structure in China. 
 The reforms set macroeconomic growth as the first priority, even if this sacrificed a 
degree of equality of income distribution and opportunity. This idea is explicit in Dengist Xianfu 
theory, which states, “Allow some people and areas to get rich first.” Such discriminatory 
treatment may be justified by the Pareto criterion because low-income people also benefit from 
economic growth to some extent. However, a large income disparity within the same country 
might strengthen feelings of unfairness in low-income people—the majority of the country—
and might cause political instability. The government mentioned its concern about income 
                                                  
1 World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001. 
2 Alexis de Tocqueville (1969, Chapter 21, part 3, vol. 2) says “Disregarding the secondary causes 
which have had some effect on the great convulsions in the world, you will almost always find that 
equality was at the heart of the matter.” 
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 differential issues at the National People’s Congress in recent years. Considering this, China is 
being faced with many challenges.  
 This paper is an analysis of the income inequality structure and its background in urban 
China, using household survey data for 1988 and 1995. These years are before and after 1992 
and, therefore, they might reflect the influence of the gradual and the rapid progress of the 
economic reforms. As explained below, attention is concentrated on urban employees whose 
income distribution has been changing dramatically as a result of the reforms. 
Section 2 of this paper explains the strategy and data of this study. Section 3 examines 
inequality for the whole urban area and provinces over the period from 1988 to 1995. Section 4 
analyzes the factors of inequality in 1988 and in 1995, and the factor contributions to inequality 
change during this period. In addition, the important factor—education—is examined in detail. 
Based on the results, recent changes and problems in the Chinese economy are discussed in 
Section 5. 
 
2. STRATEGY 
 
Review and Aims 
 In China, the income distribution of urban employees has been changing substantially 
along with the accelerating economic reforms. In addition, the number of urban employees is 
expected to surge in the near future following the urbanization policy and urban problems will 
become increasingly evident. These situations call for analyses of the inequality structure of 
urban employees to deepen insights into the current Chinese inequality issues. However, major 
inequality studies related to China have focused on rural inequality issues (Tsui (1998), Chan 
and Chan (2000), and Kung and Lee (2001)), and regional inequality, such as inter- and intra-
provincial inequality and rural–urban inequality (Hussain, Lanjouw and Stern (1994), Kanbur 
and Zhang (1999), and Lee (2000)). 
 Among the studies focusing on urban China, one strand analyzes the influence of 
various income sources on total income inequality (Hussain, Lanjouw and Stern (1994), 
Gustafsson and Li (1997), Aaberge and Li (1997), and Coady and Wang (2000)) by applying the 
factor decomposition method (Shorrocks (1982, 1983)) or the concentration coefficient (Rao 
(1969)). This approach devotes its attention to income sources to clarify their contributions to 
total inequality. Thus, it does not deal with individuals’ characteristics. Another examines the 
characteristics of urban individuals and inequality (Coady and Wang (2000), and Gustafsson and 
Li (2001)) using the sub-population group decomposition method (Bourguignon (1979), 
Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982), and Shorrocks (1984)). This approach decomposes total 
inequality into inequalities of between- and within-groups, and the sub-population group is 
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based on individuals’ characteristics. However, in this approach, the effects of factors 
(characteristics) on inequality are gross ones not controlling for the effect of any other factor.  
 This paper focuses on urban employees and analyzes the influence of accelerated 
economic reform on their income inequality. First, the widening income differentials in urban 
China between 1988 and 1995 are examined in detail. Second, the relationship between the 
characteristics of urban employees and the structure of income inequality is investigated. The 
importance of each factor in accounting for the levels of inequality in 1988 and 1995 is clarified, 
as well as for the change in inequality over the period, using a new regression-based 
decomposition approach (Fields and O’Hara (1999), Fields and Yoo (2000), and Morduch and 
Sicular (1998, 2002)). This approach allows the quantification of the contribution of each factor 
of inequality while controlling for the effects of others. Therefore, the degree of total inequality 
explained by each factor can be shown simultaneously. In addition, the factor of education, 
whose role in the inequality change is significant, is analyzed to examine the relationship 
between educational attainment and income differentials. 
 
Data 
 Microdata for China for 1988 and for 1995 are used in this analysis. These data are 
based on a large household survey, which was conducted by the Institute of Economics, Chinese 
Academy of Social Science, in 1989 and in 1996 (Griffin and Zhao (1993), and Riskin et al. 
(2000)). Although this is an important issue, studies on income distribution in China have been 
restricted by data limitations. Relatively few studies analyze income distribution in detail. 
Reflecting this situation, the survey was projected with the aim of supplying reliable data 
covering a large region of China. The data are derived from significantly large samples (about 
65,000 rural households and 35,000 urban households) drawn by the State Statistical Bureau. 
 The dataset used here is prepared from the household survey data to meet the purpose of 
our analysis. The unit of analysis is an individual urban employee, and all variables in this study 
are at the individual level. These include various personal characteristics such as age, sex and 
occupation. Income is defined as employee earnings, including cash income from working and 
subsidies except housing and ration coupons. The urban areas in the dataset consist of the urban 
areas of ten provinces, representing various regions and sizes of urban China. The provinces 
representative of the north are Liaoning and Shanxi, those of the eastern coastal region are 
Jiangsu and Guangdong, those of the interior are Anhui, Henan and Hubei, those of the west are 
Gansu and Yunnan, and Beijing represents the three large province-level municipalities. 
 The number of urban samples in the dataset is 17,459 in 1988 and 9,227 in 1995 (see 
Appendix 2 for the numbers for each province). The questions for 1988 are not exactly identical 
to those for 1995, but most of the questions in the 1988 survey are also in the 1995 survey. Our 
datasets of 1988 and of 1995 are prepared to be consistent and comparable. 
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3. INEQUALITY OF URBAN AREAS AND PROVINCES 
 
Inequality Trend 
FIGURE 3.1 
TRANSFORMED LORENZ CURVE 
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 Figure 3.1 shows transformed Lorenz curves for the urban areas3 in 1988 and in 1995, 
which are the distance of the Lorenz curve from the 45-degree line, so that the higher the curve, 
the greater the inequality. In this figure, the curve for 1988 lies entirely below the curve for 
1995. Therefore, the distribution of 1988 is more equal than that of 1995 (the distribution of 
1988 Lorenz-dominates the distribution of 1995). 
 
Inequality across and in Provinces 
FIGURE 3.2 
RELATIVE INCOME AND INEQUALITY, 1988 AND 1995 
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Note: Relative income of a province in 1988= (mean income of a province in 88) / (mean income of the 
urban areas in 88). The same manner is for 1995. 
                                                  
3 The urban areas in this paper are defined as consisting of the urban areas of the ten provinces 
mentioned in the Data part. 
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 Figure 3.2 shows the level of relative income, which is the ratio of the mean income of 
each province to the mean income of the urban areas, and the Gini coefficient for 1988 and for 
1995. 
 There is no great difference in the level of relative incomes across provinces, except 
Guangdong, in 1988. The differentials across provinces, however, widened significantly in 1995, 
which is shown as the expansion of provinces’ positions along the vertical axis in the figure. The 
differentials across the provinces as well as between the top and the bottom increased in 1995. 
 The relative income of Guangdong was already high in 1988 and increased further in 
1995. However, most provinces whose relative incomes were below the urban mean income in 
1988 reduced their positions further in 1995. This indicates that, between 1988 and 1995, the 
provinces whose relative incomes were already high in 1988 grew more than the urban mean 
income. However, most provinces whose relative incomes were low in 1988 stagnated over the 
period. This means not only that the income gap between provinces increased, but also that the 
relative position of provinces as “rich” or “poor” became fixed. 
 This figure also shows that the inequality was relatively low in 1988 (about 0.16 to 0.27, 
as measured by the Gini coefficient). However, the inequality of all provinces increased in 1995, 
shown by the substantial movement toward the right along the horizontal axis. As is shown, the 
inequality of the urban areas for 1995 (U95) moves to the right end, and all provinces except 
Guangdong are to the left of it. This is caused by the increased income gap between provinces. 
The inequality of each province increased rapidly between 1988 and 1995. In addition, the 
increase of differentials across provinces made the inequality of the urban areas higher than that 
of each province. 
 Income was more equally distributed both within and between provinces in 1988 than in 
1995. The distribution in 1995 might be the result of practicing Dengist Xianfu theory, which 
allowed some people and areas to get rich first. Implementing this theory brought rapid 
economic growth to China, but at the same time increased the income differentials both within 
and between provinces. The inequality within provinces increased both in the getting-rich-first 
provinces and in the relatively stagnant provinces. More notably, some provinces not only 
became rich first, but their advanced economic positions were becoming fixed. The changes in 
this period indicated not only the difference in the order of getting rich, but also the fixation of 
the economic ranks among provinces. 
 
4. INEQUALITY STRUCTURE 
 
Factors of Inequality in 1988 and 1995 
 In this section, the inequality structures of urban employees in 1988 and in 1995 are 
analyzed, using the new regression-based approach to inequality decomposition. 
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  The potential factors influencing income examined in this analysis fall into two 
categories: employees’ personal characteristics and the nature of jobs. The personal 
characteristics include age (age and age squared), sex, education, and CPC (Communist Party of 
China) membership. Age, sex, and education are included to examine the effects of 
demographic or individuals’ specific characteristics on income inequality, which generally play 
significant roles in income determination. CPC membership is included to examine the 
importance of political influence, which is one of the features of Chinese society. The nature of 
jobs includes enterprises’ ownership, sector, and occupation. Ownership reflects the nature of 
the Chinese economic system. Sector is to examine the compensating differentials across 
industrial sectors. Also investigated is whether occupation, which represents the position or the 
responsibility of a job, has a significant influence on income inequality. These factors are listed 
in Table 4.1. 
 
TABLE 4.1 
FACTORS OF INEQUALITY AND THEIR DEFINITION 
Factor Definition Factor Definition
Personal characteristics Sector
Age (age, age squared) forestry, fishing,
Sex female=1 water conservancy, geological prospecting
CPC Membership member=1 sec2 manufacturing
Education (academic level, graduation) sec3 construction
edu1 college or above sec4 services
edu2 community college or professional school sec5 party, government or social organs
middle level professional, sec6 others
technical or vocational school Occupation
edu4 upper middle school owner of private or individual enterprise,
edu5 lower middle school owner and manager of private or individual enterprise
edu6 elementary school or below occ2 professional or technical worker
occ3 head of institution, division head in institution
Nature of jobs occ4 office worker
Ownership occ5 laborer
owner1 state owned
owner2 local publicity owned
owner3 urban collective
private or individually owned,
sino-foreign joint venture, foreign owned
owner5 others
sec1
edu3
occ1
owner4
 
Note: Services (sec4) includes transportation, communication, posts and telecommunications, commerce 
and trade, real estate, public utilities, finance, and insurance. 
 
 The income function is estimated both for 1988 and for 1995. The estimated regression 
coefficients of the factors are reported in Appendix 2. The contribution of a factor to total 
inequality is calculated from the estimated regression coefficient of the income function: 
(ln ) ( ) [ , ln ] / (ln )k ks corβ σ σ= k kY x x Y Y . 
kx  is the k
th explanatory variable (factor),  is the contribution of the ks k
th factor to the 
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total inequality, and kβ is the estimated coefficient of the k th factor. ( )σ kx  is the standard 
deviation of the k th factor and  is the correlation between the k[ , ln ]cor kx Y
th factor and the 
log-income. (ln )σ Y
embership ex Age
Urban -0.6 6.9 10.7 3.5 7.5 72.1
Beijing 5.0 3.3 6.0 4.7 3.2 77.9
Shanxi 7.5 6.7 15.7 1.0 7.9 61.1
Liaoning 1.1 4.5 17.9 3.1 10.1 63.4
Jiangsu 0.2 11.7 11.4 3.1 4.9 68.8
Anhui 0.2 5.0 21.7 8.6 6.4 58.2
Henan -2.2 9.5 12.8 2.9 9.1 67.7
Hubei 0.3 5.3 9.6 5.5 6.2 73.2
Guangdong 4.2 15.5 18.7 4.8 7.2 49.5
Yunnan 8.2 10.0 17.8 4.7 7.8 51.4
Gansu -0.2 9.8 13.7 5.1 8.5 62.8
% Contribution
 is the standard deviation of the log-income (see Appendix 1 for the 
derivation). 
 
TABLE 4.2 
% CONTRIBUTION OF FACTORS TO INEQUALITY, 1988 
Sector Occupation Ownership Education M S
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3  
Note: The contribution is estimated excluding residual. 
 
 
TABLE 4.3 
% CONTRIBUTION OF FACTORS TO INEQUALITY, 1995 
Sector Occupation Ownership Education M embership Sex Age
Urban 0.3 12.5 12.5 13.4 8.0 8.1 45.1
Beijing 11.0 10.2 16.8 5.9 13.8 11.9 30.2
Shanxi 0.7 6.2 40.0 9.5 1.4 13.5 28.6
Liaoning -0.2 11.1 18.6 25.0 5.3 10.9 29.4
Jiangsu 6.5 8.3 9.5 13.1 7.7 5.1 49.7
Anhui 7.4 24.1 25.7 3.9 4.1 10.9 24.0
Henan -1.3 28.6 17.1 9.9 7.5 11.1 27.1
Hubei 2.2 7.1 19.2 12.5 12.0 1.3 45.7
Guangdong 7.0 26.0 2.0 26.2 8.3 3.5 27.1
Yunnan 3.9 19.8 10.4 8.9 3.4 6.6 47.1
Gansu 10.8 6.5 20.3 10.7 3.3 4.3 44.0
%  Contribution
 
Note: The contribution is estimated in the same manner as Table 4.2. 
 
 Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 show the contributions of the factors to the total inequality in 
1988 and in 1995. In Table 4.2, the largest contributing factor to the total inequality is age both 
in the urban areas and in all provinces. The second largest is ownership, and the smallest is sex 
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 in most provinces. These results indicate that the determinants for inequality were uniform 
across provinces, and income inequality was determined mainly by age in 1988. Turning to 
Table 4.3, the inequality determinants were diversified with provinces in 1995. The contribution 
of education became significant. The contribution of sex, which was almost zero in 1988, also 
increased in 1995. 
 Before the economic reforms, job placement was controlled by the government 
(following the unified job assignment system) and wages were also determined centrally (based 
on the unified standardized wage scale). The wage scale was mainly determined by age, which 
least was related to labor productivity. Therefore, the significance of age in the determination of 
earnings was likely to be a demographic characteristic in the Chinese historical context. After 
the reforms, the government began to change the employment and wage system, such as 
promoting labor mobility and the enterprises’ self-determined wage system. The progress of 
these reforms, however, was gradual especially for the employment reforms. After the mid-
1980s, there was frequent reference to the “labor force market” in China, but it just meant 
helping people to find jobs. It was after the 1990s that the government explicitly set the aim of 
employment reform as creating and promoting the labor market4. Thus, the income distribution 
in 1988 might be much affected by the former unified system, though certain wage and 
employment reforms had already started. The uniformity of inequality determinants and the age-
based distribution in 1988 reflect such features of the Chinese economy. By 1995, the 
importance of age on inequality had decreased, while that of education increased. This change 
between 1988 and 1995 reflects labor marketization. 
 
Factor Contribution to Inequality Change between 1988 and 1995 
 Combining the contribution of a factor to the inequality ( ) with the inequality ks I , the 
contribution of the factor to the change in inequality between 1988 and 1995 is given as: 
))()(())() (())(( 889588889595 ????? ⋅−⋅⋅∗−⋅∗=⋅∏ IIIsIsI kkk . 
88)( ??⋅I  and  are the inequality of log-incomes measured by the Gini coefficient for 1988 
and for 1995 (see Appendix 1 for the derivation). This study quantifies the extent to which each 
factor affects the inequality change over the period. 
95)( ??⋅I
                                                  
4 See Davis-Friedmann (1985), Walder (1986), Xiaojing and Xiao (1987), White (1988), Hu and Li 
(1993), and Amako et al. (1999) about the transition of the wage and employment system. 
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TABLE 4.4 
% CONTRIBUTION OF FACTORS TO INEQUALITY CHANGE BETWEEN 1988 AND 1995 
 
Sector Occupation Ownership Education Membership Sex Age
Urban 2.2 24.1 16.4 33.8 9.1 24.9 -10.5
Beijing 26.3 27.7 44.2 9.1 40.8 42.0 -90.2
Shanxi -15.7 4.9 98.9 30.3 -14.4 46.5 -50.5
Liaoning -1.7 18.5 19.3 49.5 -0.1 23.1 -8.7
Jiangsu 16.0 3.4 6.8 28.0 11.8 12.6 21.4
Anhui 31.7 87.8 39.4 -11.9 -3.8 47.2 -90.4
Henan 0.3 63.7 25.1 22.7 4.5 31.4 -47.8
Hubei 6.0 10.8 38.4 26.6 23.6 3.9 -9.4
Guangdong 18.1 67.2 -64.0 110.4 12.5 17.3 -61.6
Yunnan -9.3 49.6 -12.4 21.7 -10.2 26.6 34.0
Gansu 49.2 -4.9 43.5 30.3 -14.9 18.4 -21.6
% Contribution
 
 
 Table 4.4 shows that the contribution of age to the change in inequality between 1988 
and 1995 is negative in the urban areas and in most provinces. The contribution of sex is 
positive. Thus, sex difference positively contributed to the inequality increase over the period. 
The factor whose contribution is high is education. In summary, the factor of age contributed to 
the equalizing direction in income inequality along with moderating the age-based allocation 
system. However, education played the significant role in increasing inequality over the period. 
After the Southern Tour Lectures by Deng Xiaoping in 1992, the socialist market 
economy was officially recognized in China and promoting the market mechanism was 
confirmed. Since then, economic reform has accelerated. As previously noted, employment 
reform, whose progress was slow at first, proceeded towards a market-oriented situation in the 
1990s. That is, the year of 1992 was the second turning point, following the start of the 
economic reforms. The years of 1988 and of 1995, analyzed here, are before and after 1992. 
Therefore, the equalizing effect of age and the unequalizing effect of education on the inequality 
change over the period reflect the progress of the reforms. 
 
Details of Inequality Determinant: Education 
 This section examines the factor of education in detail, because it plays the significant 
role in the change in inequality over the period from 1988 to 1995. It focuses on the share and 
the relative income of each education-level group, and the inequality within each group. 
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 FIGURE 4.1 
% SHARE OF EACH EDUCATION LEVEL, URBAN AREAS 
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TABLE 4.5 
% SHARE OF EACH EDUCATION LEVEL, 1988 AND 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
edu1 edu2 edu3 edu4 edu5 edu6 edu1 edu2 edu3 edu4 edu5 edu6
Urban 6.2 6.8 11.1 24.9 38.7 12.4 8.2 16.1 17.0 24.5 29.6 4.7
Beijing 11.3 8.5 12.6 29.7 30.7 7.3 11.5 21.4 19.5 20.1 26.9 0.6
Shanxi 5.9 7.0 12.3 23.6 39.4 11.8 9.5 15.6 19.0 24.6 27.9 3.4
Liaoning 6.2 9.6 9.3 18.2 51.5 5.2 7.1 21.3 12.2 18.1 39.0 2.1
Jiangsu 5.4 6.0 9.1 27.2 39.3 13.0 7.1 13.6 14.4 26.8 32.9 5.1
Anhui 5.8 5.9 9.4 22.8 41.0 15.0 6.3 13.8 16.2 23.8 34.7 5.3
Henan 6.3 7.8 10.4 28.5 36.5 10.4 8.4 14.2 16.6 28.0 28.1 4.7
Hubei 5.8 9.8 13.9 25.3 35.7 9.5 8.5 16.4 18.7 28.2 25.2 3.1
Guangdong 6.0 4.9 9.9 30.3 32.9 16.1 7.8 15.1 13.5 28.9 25.8 8.9
Yunnan 4.7 5.3 12.7 17.6 40.5 19.3 6.9 15.3 25.2 17.9 26.6 8.1
Gansu 8.2 2.0 13.6 27.4 34.5 14.4 10.2 13.5 14.0 30.8 25.9 5.6
1988 1995
Note: edu1: college or above, edu2: community college or professional school,  
          edu3: middle level professional, technical or vocational school, 
          edu4: upper middle school, edu5: lower middle school, edu6: elementary school or below. 
 
 First, the compositional change of the education level is observed. The sum of the share 
of edu4 (upper middle school) and edu5 (lower middle school) held over half of the total both in 
1988 and in 1995, although the share of edu5 decreased in 1995 (Figure 4.1 and Table 4.5). The 
share of edu1 (college or above), edu2 (community college or professional school) and edu3 
(middle level professional, technical or vocational school) increased in 1995.  
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FIGURE 4.2 
RELATIVE INCOME OF EACH EDUCATION LEVEL, URBAN AREAS 
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TABLE 4.6 
RELATIVE INCOME OF EACH EDUCATION LEVEL, 1988 AND 1995 
 
 edu1 edu2 edu3 edu4 edu5 edu6 edu1 edu2 edu3 edu4 edu5 edu6
Urban 1.24 1.06 1.05 0.94 0.97 1.01 1.28 1.14 1.04 0.93 0.91 0.84
Beijing 1.16 1.03 1.00 0.87 1.05 1.06 1.23 1.09 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.75
Shanxi 1.21 1.03 1.11 0.92 0.97 1.03 1.29 1.03 1.06 0.93 0.92 0.85
Liaoning 1.16 1.08 1.06 0.95 0.97 1.07 1.26 1.11 1.09 0.90 0.92 0.81
Jiangsu 1.24 1.07 1.09 0.93 0.99 0.97 1.25 1.19 1.09 0.98 0.89 0.76
Anhui 1.32 1.17 1.07 0.93 0.99 0.91 1.32 1.19 1.07 0.96 0.88 0.83
Henan 1.28 1.09 1.07 0.92 0.98 1.00 1.45 1.15 1.06 0.93 0.85 0.84
Hubei 1.23 1.05 1.06 0.96 0.96 0.97 1.32 1.08 1.01 0.94 0.92 0.87
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guangdong 1.24 1.07 0.98 0.98 0.97 1.00 1.23 1.27 1.16 0.85 0.94 0.74
Yunnan 1.17 1.18 1.06 0.93 0.95 1.04 1.20 1.04 1.06 0.92 0.96 0.89
Gansu 1.34 1.02 1.11 0.88 1.00 0.93 1.25 1.09 1.04 0.92 0.98 0.73
1988 1995
 
Note: Relative income of an education-level group = (mean income of a group) / (mean income of the 
total). 
 
 The decrease in the relative incomes of edu5 (lower middle school) and of edu6 
(elementary school or below) and the increase of edu2 (community college or professional 
school) are prominent (Figure 4.2 and Table 4.6). In addition, the relative income of edu2 
becomes explicitly higher than that of edu3 (middle level professional, technical or vocational 
school) in 1995. This shows the more solid relationship between education levels and relative 
incomes in 1995. 
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 TABLE 4.7 
INEQUALITY (GINI COEFFICIENT) WITHIN EACH EDUCATION-LEVEL GROUP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
edu1 edu2 edu3 edu4 edu5 edu6 Total edu1 edu2 edu3 edu4 edu5 edu6 Total
Urban 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.30
Beijing 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.24
Shanxi 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.42 0.27
Liaoning 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.42 0.27
Jiangsu 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.32 0.26
Anhui 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.26
Henan 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.28
Hubei 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.24
Guangdong 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.27 0.31
Yunnan 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.21
Gansu 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.25
1988 1995
 
 Table 4.7 shows the inequality within each education-level group. There is an inverse 
relationship between the order of the education level and that of the inequality level, and the 
relationship becomes more explicit in 1995. In most provinces, the inequality of the groups 
whose education levels are above edu3 (middle level professional, technical or vocational 
school) is lower than the total inequality, and the inequality of edu5 (lower middle school) and 
of edu6 (elementary school or below) is higher than the total inequality in 1988. In 1995, the 
situations for the groups above edu3 or below edu5 are the same as in 1988. These results 
indicate that the income of a person, attaining above an average education level, will be 
relatively high and equally distributed and the income of a person attaining an education level 
below this will be relatively low and unevenly distributed. 
 The Human Capital theory proposed by Schultz (1960, 1962), Becker (1962), and 
Mincer (1974) is regarded as one of the key theories that explain the relationship between 
earnings and education. In this theory, education is looked on as investment in human capital 
because educational attainment can raise income through improving ability and skills as a 
worker. From this perspective, education is an important element in income inequality. As 
previously mentioned, the change in income distribution in urban China can be recognized as a 
change to a distribution more reflecting workers’ ability and skills through the emerging labor 
market. Therefore, it is now more likely to enable the Human Capital theory to be applied to the 
relationship between education and income in the Chinese economy. 
 However, that the income disparity in urban China is justified only by a meritocracy is 
perhaps too simple a conclusion. Although the Human Capital theory assumes that the amount 
of educational investment in each person is the result of her/his rational decision, it is doubtful 
whether people in China can freely or rationally choose the amounts of educational investment 
in themselves5. This draws attention to the opportunity for educational attainment in China. 
                                                  
5 Ishikawa (1991, Chapter 4) also points out that the Human Capital theory neglects the difference of 
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There is significant inequality of opportunity for education among regions and social classes in 
China (Lin (1993, 1999), and Kojima and Zheng (2001)). Particularly, access to higher 
education, which, as has been shown, is likely to lead to opportunities for higher income, has 
been limited and unevenly distributed 6. This indicates that income distribution has become 
increasingly unequal with less equality of opportunity in China. The situation is problematic and 
awaits solution. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
 How has the Chinese economy been affected by the progress of economic reform and 
the opening up to the world? This paper focused on urban employees in China, and analyzed the 
structure of their income inequality and its change to identify the new features underlying it. 
 The inequality within provinces increased in all provinces between 1988 and 1995. In 
addition, the increase in income differentials across provinces raised the total urban inequality. 
Moreover, economic ranking among provinces was becoming fixed through the accelerative 
growth of provinces whose relative incomes were already high, and the stagnant growth of 
provinces whose relative incomes were low. 
 The inequality structure was uniform in 1988; income distribution was mainly age-
based. The structure, however, changed in 1995, and the role of education in inequality became 
significant. Education was also the major factor contributing to the inequality increase over the 
period. 
 These changes reflect the penetration of the market mechanism into the Chinese 
economy, which was induced by the reform policy. After the Southern Tour Lectures in 1992, 
China identified itself as a socialist market economy and focused on making its economy more 
market-oriented through accelerating economic reform. The income differentials within and 
between provinces increased as Dengist Xianfu theory implied. The emerging labor market 
encouraged workers’ incomes to be determined more on the basis of their working ability and 
skills than before. Marketization has increased inequality and made the Chinese economy more 
meritocratic. 
 However, it is not necessarily appropriate that the income disparity between workers is 
totally justified by a meritocracy, especially in China. To justify it, opportunities for upward 
income mobility need to be widely available. However, people’s opportunities for advancement 
                                                                                                                                                  
people’s opportunity for investment. 
6 Some studies analyze the role of people’s family background on their educational attainment, using 
the Chinese urban household data (Knight and Song (1993), and Yan (2001)). They find that family 
background, such as a family’s social class or parents’ educational attainment, influences children’s 
educational attainment. 
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 have been unevenly distributed among regions and among social classes. The reform policy, 
shown exactly in Dengist Xianfu theory, treated people and provinces unevenly. Some regions 
were given priority to have the opportunity to connect with the world economy and foreign 
capital. In addition, marketization might open up avenues to upward income mobility for 
Chinese people through educational attainment, one of the most important factors on income 
inequality in our analysis. Nevertheless, access to higher education was limited and unevenly 
distributed. Moreover, there is much less freedom of job choice in China than in developed 
countries (Yan (2001)). To summarize, China seems to have become a more market-oriented 
and meritocratic economy with less equality of opportunity. Hereafter, equality of opportunity 
needs to be promoted along with marketization. 
 Finally, some political implications of the inequality increase in China are discussed. 
The rapid increase in income inequality means that the Chinese people are being separated into 
a large number of low-income people and a small number of high-income people. The CPC 
intends to incorporate these new rich people, who have come to have power recently, into its 
political base. At the 16th National Congress of CPC in 2002, the Three Represents (San ge 
Daibiao) Thought was stipulated in the CPC constitution entitling people with non-state 
economic sectors, such as owners of private enterprises, to join the CPC. However, these 
changes might raise dissatisfaction among low-income people, the original support base for the 
CPC and estrange them from the CPC. This situation, therefore, might cause political instability. 
 A large proportion of the Chinese people still have low incomes and are therefore likely 
to favor policies that are egalitarian and attach importance to redistribution. That is reasonable 
from their perspective of self-interest. Nevertheless, the actual policies seem to reflect more the 
interests of the minority—the new rich, such as private entrepreneurs—because the Chinese 
government has set the market-oriented economic reform as the first priority for economic 
growth. Anthony Downs (1957, Chapter 10, page 16) says, “Democratic governments tend to 
redistribute income from the rich to the poor.” The Chinese government is not a democratic 
government in the Western sense and, hence, his statement cannot wholly be applied to the 
Chinese case. Nonetheless, it must be difficult for any government to continue to go against the 
interests of the majority of people. 
 Considering these problems, China is now faced with many challenges to overcome. 
The Chinese government needs to establish some kind of income redistribution system, as 
developed countries did in the 20th century, and reconstruct the social security system in the new 
market-oriented economy, furthermore promoting equality of opportunity among people. 
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 APPENDIX 1. Regression-Based Approach to Inequality Decomposition 
 
We start with the income (earnings) function as follows: 
εβα ++= ∑
k
ikki xYln ,                                                                                                           (1)                               
where ? income (earnings) of worker i ,  :iY
           k th explanatory variable of worker i . :ikx
As Fields and O’Hara (1999) and Fields and Yoo (2000) indicated, given the income function 
(1), and using the theorem 3 by Shorrocks (1982, p. 204), the decomposition rule of income 
inequality is given by: 
2cov[ , ln ] (ln ) ( ) [ , ln ] (ln )k k ks coβ σ β σ σ= =k k kx Y Y x x Y Yr ,                                      (2)
where ? proportion of total inequality contributed by factor . ks k
This decomposition rule (2) holds for any inequality index, such as Gini, variance and CV, 
which satisfies the six assumptions proposed by Shorrocks (1982).   As indicated by the formula, 
the characteristic of this decomposition rule (2) is to produce a zero inequality contribution of a 
factor  which is not correlated to total income (Shorrocks (1982, 1983), and Morduch and 
Sicular (1998, 2002)).  
k
Combining  of (2) with inequality estimated by an arbitrary inequality index, the relationship 
between the change of the inequality and the factor between two years is given: 
ks
])()([)()( 00 ???????? ⋅∗−⋅∗=⋅−⋅ ∑ IsIsII kotkt
k
t ,                                                                                (3) 
where ?inequality of log-incomes at the year of t estimated by an inequality index. tI )( ??⋅
The contribution of the th factor to the change of inequality between two years is given by: k
))()(())()(())(( 000 ?????????? ⋅−⋅⋅∗−⋅∗=⋅∏ IIIsIsI tktktk .                                                                   (4) 
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APPENDIX 2. Regression Results  
 
Age
Age 0.047** (30.4) 0.115** (25.4) 0.034** (5.9) 0.106** (7.0) 0.039** (8.8) 0.096** (8.0)
Age squared -0.000** (21.1) -0.001** (22.5) -0.000** (3.4) -0.001** (6.9) -0.000** (5.2) -0.001** (6.8)
Sex -0.005 (0.9) -0.138** (10.6) 0.000 (0.0) -0.174** (3.9) -0.021 (1.4) -0.232** (6.4)
Membership 0.071** (9.5) 0.109** (6.5) 0.032 (1.2) 0.152** (2.9) 0.091** (3.8) 0.034 (0.7)
Sector
sec1 0.073** (4.7) -0.011 (0.3) 0.089 (1.3) 0.430** (3.0) 0.289** (8.2) 0.029 (0.2)
sec2 0.097** (8.8) 0.040 (1.8) 0.132** (3.2) 0.003 (0.0) 0.079* (2.6) 0.009 (0.2)
sec3 0.116** (6.7) 0.087* (2.1) 0.131 (1.9) 0.092 (0.7) -0.004 (0.1) -0.152 (0.9)
sec4 0.088** (8.3) 0.075** (3.6) 0.103** (2.7) 0.015 (0.2) 0.046 (1.6) 0.056 (1.0)
sec6 -0.046 (1.4) -0.087 (1.2) -0.245** (2.9) 0.342 (1.6) 0.002 (0.0) 0.313 (1.4)
Occupation
occ1 0.048 (1.7) -0.348** (6.0) 0.110 (1.3) 0.047 (0.2) 0.014 (0.2) -0.144 (1.1)
occ3 0.050** (3.8) 0.001 (0.0) 0.057 (1.3) 0.041 (0.5) 0.029 (0.8) -0.069 (1.0)
occ4 -0.005 (0.5) -0.082** (4.1) -0.009 (0.2) -0.045 (0.6) -0.063* (2.3) -0.124* (2.3)
occ5 -0.042** (4.2) -0.143** (7.1) -0.007 (0.2) -0.126 (1.9) -0.070* (2.5) -0.130* (2.3)
Ownership
owner1 -0.202** (7.1) -0.285** (6.0) -0.065 (0.8) -0.204 (1.2) -0.187 (1.5) 0.327 (1.8)
owner2 -0.233** (8.2) -0.387** (8.3) -0.105 (1.3) -0.233 (1.4) -0.298* (2.4) -0.007 (0.0)
owner3 -0.330** (11.5) -0.538** (11.1) -0.178* (2.2) -0.571** (3.0) -0.382** (3.1) -0.239 (1.3)
owner5 -0.393** (8.1) -0.062 (0.5) -0.226 (0.7) -0.586 (1.0) -0.629** (3.7) -1.015* (2.4)
Education
edu1 0.174** (11.7) 0.372** (9.4) 0.098 (1.8) 0.258 (0.9) 0.174** (3.9) 0.403** (3.4)
edu2 0.101** (7.1) 0.302** (8.4) 0.086 (1.5) 0.158 (0.5) 0.102* (2.4) 0.338** (3.0)
edu3 0.081** (6.6) 0.273** (7.8) 0.061 (1.1) 0.085 (0.3) 0.114** (3.1) 0.415** (3.8)
edu4 0.088** (8.7) 0.204** (6.3) 0.032 (0.7) 0.155 (0.5) 0.101** (3.2) 0.299** (2.9)
edu5 0.067** (7.4) 0.133** (4.3) 0.089* (2.0) 0.131 (0.5) 0.111** (3.9) 0.222* (2.2)
F value 278.2** 106.7** 18.6** 6.8** 47.3** 22.2**
Adj. R2 0.259 0.201 0.313 0.152 0.356 0.315
N 17459 9227 851 706 1846 1018
Urban Beijing Shanxi
1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995
 
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics is in parentheses.   
Statistical significance at the 0.01 level and 0.05 level are indicated as * * and * respectively. 
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 APPENDIX 2. (continued, 2/4)  
 
Age
Age 0.027** (7.2) 0.110** (8.8) 0.054** (16.2) 0.163** (14.5) 0.052** (11.2) 0.102** (7.9)
Age squared -0.000** (3.6) -0.001** (8.0) -0.001** (12.1) -0.002** (13.7) -0.000** (7.9) -0.001** (7.4)
Sex 0.006 (0.5) -0.178** (5.2) 0.004 (0.3) -0.122** (3.4) -0.002 (0.1) -0.167** (4.3)
Membership 0.079** (5.1) 0.102* (2.2) 0.056** (3.3) 0.138** (2.8) 0.080** (3.2) 0.066 (1.3)
Sector
sec1 0.206** (4.7) 0.049 (0.4) 0.140** (3.8) 0.511** (3.1) 0.052 (1.1) -0.257* (2.3)
sec2 0.114** (4.6) 0.221** (3.1) 0.082** (3.2) 0.006 (0.1) 0.165** (4.3) -0.121 (1.8)
sec3 0.229** (6.9) 0.265** (2.8) 0.093 (1.9) 0.287* (2.1) 0.165** (2.9) -0.155 (1.2)
sec4 0.120** (4.8) 0.181** (2.6) 0.083** (3.3) 0.107 (1.6) 0.089* (2.4) -0.007 (0.1)
sec6 0.088 (0.9) 0.088 (0.7) -0.313** (3.2) -0.046 (0.2) 0.293* (2.3) -0.018 (0.1)
Occupation
occ1 0.176* (2.4) -0.213 1.4 0.462** (3.8) -0.304 (1.6) -0.168 (1.9) -0.019 (0.1)
occ3 0.062* (2.3) 0.097 (1.4) 0.134** (3.6) -0.003 (0.0) 0.036 (0.8) -0.040 (0.6)
occ4 -0.007 (0.3) -0.171** (3.2) 0.020 (1.0) -0.003 (0.1) 0.002 (0.1) -0.131* (2.2)
occ5 -0.006 (0.3) -0.061 (1.2) -0.044* (2.1) -0.116* (2.0) -0.041 (1.3) -0.275** (4.5)
Ownership
owner1 -0.502** (4.9) -0.271 (1.8) 0.237* (2.2) -0.145 (1.3) -0.088 (0.9) 0.146 (0.8)
owner2 -0.593** (5.8) -0.422** (2.9) 0.204 (1.9) -0.203 (1.9) -0.134 (1.3) -0.003 (0.0)
owner3 -0.634** (6.2) -0.625** (4.1) 0.089 (0.8) -0.377** (3.4) -0.321** (3.2) -0.229 (1.3)
owner5 -0.176 (1.0) -0.250 (0.7) 0.460** (3.6) -0.135 (0.3) -0.636** (3.2) 0.621 (1.6)
Education
edu1 0.135** (3.5) 0.688** (5.1) 0.148** (4.6) 0.47** (4.3) 0.281** (6.0) 0.048 (0.4)
edu2 0.092** (2.6) 0.571** (4.6) 0.106** (3.4) 0.457** (4.6) 0.249** (5.5) 0.065 (0.6)
edu3 0.065 (1.9) 0.541** (4.3) 0.101** (3.7) 0.499** (5.3) 0.148** (3.8) 0.042 (0.4)
edu4 0.062* (2.0) 0.405** (3.3) 0.094** (4.5) 0.393** (4.6) 0.140** (4.7) 0.057 (0.6)
edu5 0.052 (1.9) 0.315** (2.7) 0.089** (4.8) 0.303** (3.8) 0.153** (5.9) -0.016 (0.2)
F value 44.5** 16.1** 63.9** 19.7** 45** 14.6**
Adj. R2 0.342 0.229 0.379 0.263 0.362 0.283
N 1848 1120 2267 1151 1704 761
Liaoning Jiangsu Anhui
1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995
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APPENDIX 2. (continued, 3/4)  
 
Age
Age 0.048** (12.4) 0.083** (6.1) 0.041** (10.7) 0.077** (6.9) 0.060** (10.3) 0.105** (6.6)
Age squared -0.000** (8.5) -0.001** (5.3) -0.000** (7.1) -0.001** (5.6) -0.001** (8.4) -0.001** (6.0)
Sex -0.015 (1.1) -0.178** (4.3) 0.002 (0.1) -0.033 (1.2) -0.009 (0.5) -0.099* (2.2)
Membership 0.091** (4.7) 0.104 (1.9) 0.052** (3.2) 0.127** (3.6) 0.085** (2.9) 0.116* (2.1)
Sector
sec1 0.111* (2.4) 0.043 (0.3) -0.014 (0.3) -0.135 (1.3) -0.095 (1.0) -0.165 (1.0)
sec2 0.100** (3.7) 0.079 (1.2) 0.089** (3.5) -0.020 (0.4) 0.044 (1.1) -0.008 (0.1)
sec3 0.053 (1.1) -0.088 (0.5) 0.129** (3.7) -0.175* (2.2) 0.092 (1.4) 0.563** (3.4)
sec4 0.065* (2.5) 0.063 (1.0) 0.059* (2.4) -0.021 (0.5) 0.098** (2.6) 0.030 (0.4)
sec6 0.049 (0.5) - 0.100 (1.0) 0.045 (0.1) -0.107 (1.1) -0.092 (0.3)
Occupation
occ1 -0.164* (2.0) -0.290 (1.5) 0.357** (3.5) -0.074 (0.6) 0.402** (4.7) -0.429** (2.6)
occ3 0.008 (0.2) 0.049 (0.6) 0.023 (0.8) -0.049 (1.0) 0.129* (2.5) 0.093 (1.1)
occ4 -0.047 (1.9) -0.113 (1.6) 0.000 (0.0) -0.049 (1.2) 0.050 (1.3) -0.115 (1.7)
occ5 -0.097** (3.6) -0.283** (4.1) -0.022 1.0 -0.102* (2.3) -0.027 (0.7) -0.228** (3.2)
Ownership
owner1 -0.014 (0.1) 0.200 (1.0) 0.132 (1.1) 0.133 (1.1) -0.056 (1.0) -0.037 (0.3)
owner2 -0.070 (0.8) -0.019 (0.1) 0.074 (0.6) -0.008 (0.1) -0.224** (4.1) -0.254** (2.7)
owner3 -0.210* (2.3) -0.137 (0.6) 0.023 (0.2) -0.193 (1.5) -0.129* (2.3) -0.167 (1.7)
owner5 -0.123 (0.4) - -0.272 (1.7) -0.330 (1.0) -0.419** (4.2) 0.006 (0.0)
Education
edu1 0.179** (4.6) 0.251 (1.9) 0.186** (5.1) 0.316** (3.3) 0.184** (3.4) 0.348** (2.9)
edu2 0.113** (3.1) 0.229 (1.9) 0.094** (3.0) 0.196* (2.2) 0.141** (2.6) 0.392** (3.8)
edu3 0.091** (2.8) 0.206 (1.8) 0.078** (2.7) 0.156 (1.8) 0.040 (0.9) 0.351** (3.4)
edu4 0.103** (3.8) 0.181 (1.7) 0.089** (3.6) 0.104 (1.2) 0.071* (2.1) 0.086 (1.0)
edu5 0.074** (3.0) 0.087 (0.9) 0.051* (2.2) 0.076 (0.9) 0.039 (1.3) 0.113 (1.3)
F value 56.9** 14.1** 40.0** 16.0** 24.3** 10.6**
Adj. R2 0.378 0.226 0.310 0.233 0.197 0.193
N 2020 900 1910 1088 2088 887
Henan Hubei Guangdong
1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995
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 APPENDIX 2. (continued, 4/4)  
 
Age
Age 0.016** (4.0) 0.104** (8.0) 0.047** (8.6) 0.122** (8.1)
Age squared -0.000        (0.9) -0.001** (6.9) -0.000** (5.5) -0.001** (6.7)
Sex 0.002 (0.2) -0.094** (3.0) 0.022 (1.1) -0.102* (2.4)
Membership 0.068** (3.8) 0.048 (1.3) 0.100** (4.0) 0.067 (1.1)
Sector
sec1 0.059 (1.6) -0.211** (2.6) -0.050 (1.0) -0.021 (0.2)
sec2 0.189** (7.0) -0.014 (0.3) 0.021 (0.5) -0.040 (0.6)
sec3 0.103* (2.2) -0.044 (0.4) 0.074 (1.3) 0.007 (0.1)
sec4 0.047 (1.8) -0.057 (1.2) 0.003 (0.1) 0.064 (1.1)
sec6 -0.156 (1.6) -0.485** (2.6) -0.014 (0.2) -1.113** (5.5)
Occupation
occ1 0.010 (0.1) 0.021 (0.1) 0.184 (1.7) 0.083 (0.3)
occ3 0.001 (0.0) -0.035 (0.7) -0.018 (0.4) 0.063 (0.8)
occ4 -0.060** (2.6) -0.121** (2.7) -0.075* (2.1) -0.079 (1.2)
occ5 -0.105** (4.3) -0.212** (4.5) -0.120** (3.1) -0.067 (0.9)
Ownership
owner1 0.163 (1.6) 0.042 (0.2) 0.375** (2.6) 0.411 (0.9)
owner2 0.112 (1.1) -0.013 (0.1) 0.330* (2.2) 0.281 (0.6)
owner3 -0.065 (0.6) -0.191 (1.1) 0.171 (1.2) -0.096 (0.2)
owner5 -0.296* (2.2) 0.381 (1.0) -0.168 (0.9) 0.219 (0.3)
Education
edu1 0.100** (2.6) 0.291** (3.4) 0.222** (4.5) 0.549** (4.4)
edu2 0.116** (3.2) 0.150* (2.0) 0.119 (1.5) 0.421** (3.5)
edu3 0.032 (1.2) 0.204** (3.0) 0.161** (3.9) 0.354** (3.1)
edu4 0.016 (0.7) 0.137* (2.0) 0.141** (4.0) 0.281** (2.8)
edu5 0.016 (0.8) 0.125* (2.0) 0.144** (4.4) 0.340** (3.5)
F value 35.6** 13.5** 37.2** 18.0**
Adj. R2 0.298 0.212 0.415 0.396
N 1799 1025 1126 571
Yunnan Gansu
1988 1995 1988 1995
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